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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This Court has jurisdiction oves this appeal by authority
of Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j).

Plaintiff filed this

action in the Second Judicial District Court for Weber County.
Both defendants filed motions to dismiss.

At the hearing on those

motions, the trial judge granted defendants' motions as to the
first two causes of action with prejudice and as to the third
cause of action without prejudice, giving plaintiff twenty days'
leave to file an amended complaint.

Plaintiff filed no amended

complaint but instead filed this appeal.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court was correct in finding as a

matter of law that the Exhibits attached to the plaintiff's
Complaint contain no express agreement or covenant prohibiting St.
Benedict's Hospital ("St. Benedict's") from building another
medical office building on its property, or requiring St.
Benedict's to give plaintiff a right of first refusal on
construction of such a building.
2.

Whether the trial court was correct in finding as a

matter of law that no such restrictive covenant on St. Benedict's
use of property not covered by the agreements with plaintiff may
be implied into the lengthy, written agreements between plaintiff
and St. Benedict's.
3.

Whether a claim for breach of an implied covenant of

good faith and fair dealing may be asserted to enforce such an
alleged implied restrictive covenant on the use of land.
-1-

4.

Whether the plaintiff's claim of interference with

economic relations failed to state a claim as pleaded, and should
be dismissed without prejudice.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
While most of the determinative provisions in this case
are products of case law, St. Benedict's submits that the
following provision is also determinative:
Utah Code Annotated § 25-5-3 (1953):
Every contract for the leasing for a longer
period than one year, or for the sale, of any
lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void
unless the contract, or some note or memorandum
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by
whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his
lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff filed this action in June, 1989, seeking
damages and injunctive relief to enforce

a claimed contractuaJ

provision against St. Benedict's that St. Benedict's
was bound and obligated to Plaintiff not to
construct or permit the construction of
additional facilities on its property for rental
or occupancy by medical personnel practicing at
said hospital until such time as there was no
more available space in Plaintiff's facility and
then only by offering Plaintiff the opportunity
to construct and provide such service.
Complaint 1[ 29, R. 10-11.

Plaintiff variously alleged that such

provision was an express obligation in the four documents attached
as Exhibits to the Complaint, that it was an implied provision,
and that it was to be enforced as part of an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.
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Plaintiff also asserted a cause of action for "tortuous
(sic) interference with Plaintiff's present and prospective
contractual relations with others . . . " Complaint If 44, R. 15,
claiming that St. Benedict's and the Boyer Company had tortiously
injured plaintiff by permitting competition with plaintiff.
Both defendants moved to dismiss.
by Judge Roth on August 30, 1989.

The motions were heard

He granted the motions,

dismissing with prejudice the first and second causes of action
(for injunctive relief and damages, respectively, on the express
and implied contract claims), and dismissing the tortious
interference claim without prejudice.

The Court's Order was

entered on September 29, 1989, and plaintiffs Notice of Appeal
was filei on October 12, 1989.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
1.

St. Benedict's has leased certain land on its campus

to plaintiff on which plaintiff has built and operates
professional office buildings serving doctors who have privileges
at St. Benedict's.

Plaintiff attached copies of some of the

agreements surrounding this relationship, including the agreements
currently in effect, as exhibits to its Complaint.
2.

R. 17-59.

None of those agreements restrict St. Benedict's

ability to build other professional office buildings on other land
on its campus, or require St. Benedict's to give plaintiff a right
of first refusal to build or operate any new building.
205-35.
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R. 17-59,

3.

St. Benedict's has leased certain other land on its

campus to the Boyer Company, who is building a medical office
building on such property.

R. 13.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff seeks to enforce a restrictive covenant
prohibiting St. Benedict's from building a medical office building
on its property without giving plaintiff a right of first refusal
and even then only under certain other conditions relating to the
occupancy of plaintiff's medical office buildings on St.
Benedict's campus.

That restriction simply is not present in the

contracts between St. Benedict's and the plaintiff, and
accordingly cannot be the subject of a breach of express contract
claim.
No such restrictive covenant may be implied.
covenants are generally not favored.

Implied

Restrictive covenants in

general and especially restrictive covenants on the use of lane
are also not favored.

Implied restrictive covenants on the use of

land simply do not exist.

Even express restrictive covenants are

read narrowly by courts in Utah and other jurisdictions.
Plaintiff has presented no cases where a court implied a
restrictive covenant without the presence of exclusive use
language or other expressed intention by the parties.
The statute of frauds and the parol evidence rule also
preclude the implication of any implied restrictive covenants such
as plaintiff seeks in this case.

It would have been easy enough

for the parties to include the restrictions plaintiff seeks to
-4-

enforce in their agreements.

They did not do so, and the parties'

contracts should not be rewritten by the.Court to imply such a
restriction.
Plaintiff also asserts a claim related to an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

There is even less

reason to enforce claims for breach of such an implied covenant in
the context of interests in real property than there is with
respect to employment contracts.

The covenant of good faith and

fair dealing simply has no application in trying to imply a
restriction on the use of land where there are extensive written
documents governing the transaction.
The plaintiff's Third Cause of Action was for
interference with economic relations.

It fails to state a claim

as to interference with contract because it does not allege that
any existing contracts have been breached.

It also fails to state

a claim as to interference with prospective economic relations
because no improper means or improper purpose are alleged.

The

closest thing to an improper means any of plaintiff's memoranda
have raised is an alleged breach of contract.

Under the standards

set forth in Utah case law, that is clearly inadequate to be an
improper means to establish this tort.

St. Benedict's has a

strong, long-term economic interest in having ample and adequate
first-class medical office space on and around its campus so that
it may attract the number and quality of physicians it needs to
practice at its hospital, as set forth in the recitals to the
various agreements between the parties.
-5-

R. 17-59.

Therefore, it

is clear that even if plaintiff's allegations were true, St.
Benedict's predominant purpose would be its own economic
self-interest and not any vendetta against the plaintiff.
Therefore, the lower court was correct in dismissing plaintiff's
Third Cause of Action without prejudice.
Finally, plaintiff's complaints regarding the alleged
influence on the judge by the defense counsel, the plaintiff's
lack of discovery (despite the fact that St. Benedict's did
respond to plaintiff's discovery reguests prior to the motion to
dismiss), and the plaintiff's lack of an opportunity to amend its
first two causes of action (despite no reguest by plaintiff) are
all without merit and provide no basis for reversing Judge Roth's
ruling in this case.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT BELOW WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THAT THE FIRST AND
SECOND CAUSES OF ACTION DO NOT STATE CLAIMS UPON WHICH RELIEF
MAY BE GRANTED,
Plaintiff's first two causes of action seek the benefit

of a bargain which plaintiff never made.
enforce a contract which never existed.

Plaintiff is trying to
Plaintiff's first two

causes of action are for an injunction and damages and attempt to
require St. Benedict's
not to construct or permit the construction of
additional facilities on its property for rental
or occupancy by medical personnel practicing at
said hospital until such time as there was no
more available space in Plaintiff's facility and
then only by offering Plaintiff the opportunity
to construct and provide such service.
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Complaint, 1f 29, R. 10-11.

Elsewhere in the Complaint, plaintiff

states the restriction in even broader terms, seeking to restrain
St. Benedict's from
proceeding with the proposed construction and
maintenance of a professional building on Defendant
Hospital's property unless and until Plaintiffs'
(sic) professional buildings are completely
occupied with reliable long term tenants, and there
is demand and necessity reasonably (sic) to
construct an additional facility, and then only by
offering Plaintiff the first opportunity to
construct said additional facility.
Complaint 1[ 37, R. 13 (emphasis added).

Whether plaintiff claims

that this restriction is an express agreement of the parties,
should be implied into their agreements, or somehow flows from an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the Complaint,
its exhibits, and the law compel the conclusion that plaintiff has
no cause of action regarding the alleged restrictive covenant.
A.

THE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES DO NOT CONTAIN THE
EXPRESS PROVISION PLAINTIFF SEEKS TO ENFORCE.
A review of the agreements between the parties shows, as

Judge Roth found, that there are no restrictions imposed on St.
Benedict's such as those described in the above-quoted portions of
the Complaint.

At one point at least, even plaintiff agreed with

this position.

As plaintiff stated in its Memorandum in

Opposition to the motions to dismiss:
It is clear in the present case that the
lease, although containing no express provision
that future building would be conducted between
the two parties in the same manner, demanded an
implied exclusive obligation in favor of
Plaintiff if the project was to succeed.
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Memo in Opp. at 11, R. 135 (emphasis added).

For plaintiff to

argue on appeal that an express covenant^has been violated is
disingenuous.

Moreover, it is clear that none of the many

provisions quoted by plaintiff impose such a requirement on St.
Benedict's.

There is nothing which even begins to impose any

restrictions on any use by St. Benedict's of its property not
covered by the leases, let alone the many additional restrictions
plaintiff seeks to impose.
Where the express covenant plaintiff wishes to enforce
does not exist, plaintiff's claims concerning the alleged breach
of that covenant must fail as a matter of law.
B.

RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS ARE NOT FAVORED IN THE LAW AND WILL
NOT BE IMPLIED.
It is well established that implied covenants, generally,

are not favored in the law.

Brown v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 617

P.2d 704, 710 (Wash. 1980); see also, In re KPT Industries, 30
B.R. 252, 254 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); Stern v. Dunlap Co., 228
F.2d 939, 942 (10th Cir. 1955).
Restrictive covenants are also not favored.

See, e.g. ,

Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1982) (covenants not to
compete are enforceable if carefully drawn to protect only the
legitimate interests of the employer).

More specifically,

restrictions on the free use of property will not be implied
unless they necessarily follow from clear language of written
restrictions.

"[A] restrictive covenant as to property retained

by a lessor must be evidenced by a clearly expressed intention."
-8-

Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Kaplan, 108 So.2d 503, 505 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (emphasis in original); see also, 49
AM.JUR.2d, Landlord and Tenant, § 162 (1970).
Even where (unlike this case) the instruments expressly
contain restrictive covenants, courts will construe those
covenants strictly, since they act as restraints on the free use
of real estate.
Covenants and agreements restricting the
free use of property are strictly construed
against limitations upon such use. Such
restrictions will not be aided or extended by
implication or enlarged by construction to affect
lands not specifically described, or to grant
rights to persons in whose favor it is not
clearly shown such restrictions are to apply.
Doubt will be resolved in favor of the
unrestricted use of property. . . .
20 AM.JUR.2d Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions, § 187 (1965)
(footnotes omitted).
Utah law follows this rule of strict construction.

In

Parrish v. Richards, 8 Utah 2d 419, 336 P.2d 122 (Utah 1959), the
defendants erected a tennis court and fence which the plaintiff
alleged was in violation of an express restrictive covenant.

This

Court held that where such restrictions are uncertain or ambiguous
"the courts will resolve all doubts in favor of the free and
unrestricted use of property. . . . "

336 P.2d at 123.

The

Parrish court concluded that a tennis court and fence did not
violate a covenant expressly restricting erection of a fence, wall
or similar structure.

The Parrish court distinguished a tennis

court and fence from sheds, barns and stores which it determined
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were contemplated by the covenant.

Ij3-

See also, Freeman v.

Gee, 18 Utah 2d 339, 423 P.2d 155, at 159, 165 (1967); Campbell v.
Glacier Park Co., 381 F. Supp. 1243 (D. Idaho 1974) (creation of a
recreation area within the subdivision did not violate the
covenant of residential use).
The strict construction imposed by the courts was further
demonstrated in Sylvester v. hotel Pasco, 279 P. 566 (Wash. 1929),
where the court held that an express covenant that the lessor will
not let other property to a business competing with the lessee
does not preclude the lessor himself from conducting such a
competing business.
Other courts have refused to imply the kind of
restriction sought by plaintiff.

The California Supreme Court

held that the owner of a store containing many departments may
lease them all to competing merchants, absent an express covenant
to prevent him from doing so.

The owner is under no implied

obligation to give any one tenant the exclusive right to sell any
particular product.
(Cal. 1951).

Stockton Dry Goods Co. v. Girsh, 227 P.2d 1

The Stockton court found no implied restrictive

covenant notwithstanding the fact that there had always been only
one shoe department in the store.
St. Benedict's, like the lessor in Stockton, is under no
implied obligation to provide the plaintiff with the exclusive
right to provide offices for the hospital staff.

St. Benedict's

never agreed to grant such a right; there is simply no basis to
imply such a covenant and no precedent for such an implication.
-10-

See generally, Anno., 22 A.L.R.2d 1466 (without language showing
intention to grant an exclusive privilege to carry on the
particular business, the lessor is under no implied obligation to
not compete with the tenant or to not permit other property owned
by him to be used for such competition).
Despite plaintiff's claim that its claims are "not
novel," Appellant's Brief at 23, none of the three cases plaintiff
cites supports its claim.

In both Keating v. Preston, 42

Cal.App.2d 110, 108 P.2d 479 (1940), and Belvedere Hotel Co. v.
Williams, 137 Md. 665, 113 A.335 (1921), there was language which
showed the parties' intention to grant an exclusive right to the
lessee.

Despite ample opportunity, plaintiff has not and cannot

show any language from the agreements in this case which grant an
exclusive right to the plaintiff to be the sole operator of
medical office space around the St. Benedict's Hospital.

In

Carter v. Adler, 291 P.2d 111 (Cal. App. 1956), the lessee was
granted "exclusive rights on Grocery . . .
Boulevard. . . ."

291 P.2d at 112.

at 6127 Sepulveda

The court prevented the

lessor from going forward with another supermarket at the same
address.

Without a grant of exclusive rights, plaintiff here has

no claim.
Plaintiff's argument at pp. 21-22 of its Brief that since
the leases impose restrictions on plaintiff, plaintiff should
"achieve its reasonable expectations flowing from their contracts"
through enforcement of implied restrictions is baseless.

Any

expectations plaintiff has which are not grounded on express
-11-

provisions of the leases are prima facie not reasonable.

All of

the restrictions on the plaintiff are express--they were part of
the basis of the bargain, just as was the nominal one dollar per
year rent plaintiff must pay.

The reason for the lease's

existence was to provide St. Benedict's with the type of building
described.

If plaintiff nad wished to impose the restrictions it

now seeks on St. Benedict's, it could have negotiated for them.
The general contract cases cited by plaintiff have no
application to this situation.

In Nixon and Nixon v. John New &

Associates, Inc., 641 P.2d 144 (Utah 1982), the quoted language
dealt with whether a contract had been formed/ and whether the
lack of a term as to time of performance precluded specific
performance.

It did not deal with implying anything into the

contract other than recognizing that the general rule requires
"completion within a reasonable time under all circumstances."
Id. at 146.

There is no analogous "general rule" mandating

implied restrictive covenants on the use of land; indeed the rule
is just the opposite.

Similarly, Quality Performance Lines v.

Yoho Automotive, Inc., 609 P.2d 1340 (Utah 1980), addresses when a
contract can be implied from the parties' conduct under Article
Two of the UCC, not whether to imply restrictive covenants on the
use of land.

Finally, in DuBois v. Nye, 584 P.2d 823 (Utah 1978),

the Court refused to read an express covenant allocating the risk
of loss between the buyer and seller of a house to indemnify the
defendant for her own negligence.

That case can hardly be argued
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for the position that a restrictive covenant should be implied in
spite of the parties' extensive written agreements.
Here, plaintiff seeks to enforce an implied restrictive
covenant.

The restriction sought to be enforced in this case is

not "carefully drawn," nor is it evidenced by a "clearly expressed
intention."

It is not expressed at all.

This restriction is not

merely uncertain or ambiguous like the restriction this Court
refused to enforce in Parrish, it is nonexistent.

Plaintiff's

counsel has attempted to come up with reasons why the restrictions
it seeks to enforce mignt be desirable to the plaintiff.

Those

are reasons the plaintiff should have bargained and negotiated to
include the restrictions in the leases, they are not excuses to
rewrite the parties' agreement.
As stated in Union Pacific Railroad Company v. El Paso
Natural Gas Company, 17 Utah 2d 255, 408 P.2d 910 (1965):
If it had been the intent of the parties
that the defendant should indemnify the plaintiff
against the latter*s negligent acts, it would
have been easy enough to use that very language
and to thus make that intent clear and
unmistakable, which was not done.
408 P.2d at 914. There, the Court refused to permit a broad
reading of an express indemnity clause to reach a disfavored
result—indemnification for a party's own negligence. Here,
plaintiff also seeks a disfavored result—a serious restriction on
the use of land not even covered by the agreements between the
parties.

Moreover, plaintiff seeks to imply it out of nothing,

not merely read an existing restriction broadly.

-13-

Just as in Union

Pacific, it would have been easy enough to use clear language to
express the restrictions plaintiff seeks.to enforce.

That was not

done, and the Court should not undertake to do it for the parties
where they did not do so themselves.

C.

PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM VIOLATES THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
Utah law requires that any interest in real property be

in writing.

Utah Code Annotated § 25-5-1 (1987).

With regard to

leases, the Utah Code provides:
Every contract for the leasing fo r a longer
period than one year, or for the sale, of any
land, or any interest in lands, shall be void
unless the contract, or some not or memorandum
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by
whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his
lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing.
Utah Code Annotated § 25-5-3 (1953) (emphasis added).
The plain language of the statute indicates that an
interest such as plaintiff claims cannot arise by implication, but
must be in writing.

The statute exists to avoid claims such as

those raised in this case, and precludes plaintiff from obtaining
any recovery.
D.

THE PARTIES' INTENT IS DETERMINED FROM THE FINAL
AGREEMENT.
Under the parol evidence rule, the written lease

agreement is the final and complete agreement.

See, e.g., Lamb v.

Bangart, 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974) (written agreement for sale of
livestock is an integrated contract); E.A. Strout Western Realty
Agency, Inc. v. Broderick, 522 P.2d 144 (Utah 1974) (written
-14-

agreement to pay real estate commission cannot be modified by
parol evidence where terms are clear, definite and unambiguous).
Moreover, the intent of the parties is determined from
the final written agreement and not from prior or contemporaneous
conversations, representations or statements.

In Commercial Bldg.

Corp. v. Blair, 565 P.2d 776 (Utah 1977), this Court held that:
The rule in the State of Utah, as elsewhere,
is that parol evidence may be admitted to show
the intent of the parties if the language of a
written contract is vague and uncertain. On the
other hand, such evidence cannot be permitted to
vary or contradict the plain language of the
contract.
The parties' intention is to be determined
from the final agreement executed by them and not
from prior or contemporaneous conversations,
representations or statements.
Id. at 778 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
In the instant case, the parties executed a final written
agreement which makes no reference to the covenant that the
plaintiff contends should be implied.
covenant does not exist.

There is no ambiguity; the

Plaintiff cannot introduce parol

evidence to vary the agreement by adding unfavored terms to an
agreement that is presumptively final and complete.
E.

THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING IS
NOT SUFFICIENT TO CREATE A RESTRICTIVE COVENANT.
Plaintiff also argues that St. Benedict's has somehow

violated an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

St.

Benedict's is aware of no Utah cases finding such a covenant in a
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lease of real property.

Even if such an implied covenant existed,

there is no indication that its violation would be actionable.
The only situation where a cause of action on such an implied
covenant has been permitted in Utah is in the context of a
first-party insurance bad faith claim.
Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 79b (Utah 1985).

See, e.g., Beck v. Farmers
This Court recently

declined to permit such a cause of action in the context of a
contract of employment.

Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d

1033 (Utah 1989); Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc., 777
P.2d 483, 485 (Utah 1989); Loose v. Nature-All Corporation, 122
U.A.R. 5 (Utah 1989).
In the instant case, even if a covenant of good faith and
fair dealing is implicit in the plaintiff's lease, there is no
authority to permit the Court to construe such an implied covenant
to impose a restrictive covenant such as plaintiff claims here.
See, e.g., Stockton, supra, 227 P.2d at 3 ("A restrictive covenant
as to property retained by a . . . lessor must be evidenced by a
clearly expressed intention.").

Indeed, no court has ever

stretched the concept so liberally as plaintiff urges.
Plaintiff's attempt to distinguish the employment cases
on the ground that employers * long-settled reliance on the
doctrine of employment-at-will somehow precludes the possibility
of a breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
claim flies in the face of both the analysis in the Court's
opinions on the issue and the existence of significant,
well-established, and long-standing doctrines which militate
-16-

against permitting such a cause of action in this situation.
Justice Zimmerman's opinion in Berube is*the only place any of the
majority opposing the recognition of this claim in employment
cases discusses their rationale.

That opinion clearly shows that

his reluctance centers on the uncertainty such a claim would
impose on employers trying to terminate employees, not the
employers' reliance on employment-at-will.
1051-1052.

771 P.2d at

Similarly, recognizing a claim for breach of an

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the context of
real property would subject everyone with interests in land, and
especially landlords, to extreme uncertainty in determining
whether their leases and other instruments reflecting interests in
land medn what they say or can be twisted to impose extensive,
im.plied restrictions such as plaintiff seeks in this case.
Moreover, to the extent employers' reliance on
employment-at-will is a basis for refusing to permit implied
covenant claims in that context; the existence of the
well-established doctrines against implying covenants, against
reading even express restrictive covenants broadly, against
restricting the use of land, the statute of frauds, and the parol
evidence rule all clearly show that it is inappropriate to permit
such a cause of action in this case.

As Justice Durham indicated

in her opinion in Berube, claims for violation of covenants of
good faith and fair dealing should be used "sparingly and with
caution."

771 P.2d at 1047.

There is no support for the

contention that an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
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can be construed to create a restrictive covenant in a real estate
lease, and so the lower court's Order should be affirmed.
In sum, there is absolutely no support for plaintiff's
claim.

There is no language in any of the agreements to support

its claim that any express covenant arose, and no implied covenant
may be imposed due to the statute of frauds, the parol evidence
rule, and well-established canons of construction of conveyances
of interests in real estate.

Moreover, restrictive covenants are

not favored in the law, and are strictly construed even when
explicitly stated.

There is no basis for •"hem to be read into the

agreement between the parties by the Court.

Finally, there is no

authority for plaintiff's claim that an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing would give rise to a restrictive covenant
as plaintiff asserts. While it is doubtful that any cause of
action for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing lies in this situation, it is clear that under the
restrictive view of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing adopted by this Court, it would be improper to read a
disfavored restrictive covenant into the lease through the
operation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

II.

THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S THIRD
CAUSE OF ACTION BECAUSE IT DOES NOT ESTABLISH INTENTIONAL
INTERFERENCE WITH ECONOMIC RELATIONS AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action attempts to allege

claims of intentional interference with contractual relations and
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage
-18-

concerning the possibility that another building will be available
for professional office space on the St. Benedict's campus.
A.

NO CLAIM OF INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT MAY LIE WHEN
NO EXISTING CONTRACT IS IMPAIRED.
The tort of interference with contract was defined in

Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982), as
conduct which 'intentionally and improperly
interferes with the performance of a contract
. . . between another and a third person by
inducing or otherwise causing the third person
not to perform the contract.'
657 P.2d at 301 (citations omitted, quoting Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 766 (1979)).
For an interference with contract claim to lie, it is
essential that the performance of an existing contract be
impaired.

There is no allegation in plaintiff's Complaint that

any existing lease between plaintiff and its tenants was breached,
or that the performance under any of those leases was in any way
impaired.

Plaintiff's allegations merely go to the claim that its

ability to renew leases with its tenants was somehow damaged.
Without any allegation that St. Benedict's has somehow interfered
with the performance of an existing contract, no claim for
interference with contract can lie.
B.

PLAINTIFF FAILS TO ALLEGE A CLAIM OF INTERFERENCE WITH
PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC RELATIONS.
The tort of intentional interference with prospective

economic relations was defined in the Leigh Furniture case as
requiring the plaintiff to prove

-19-

(1) that the defendant intentionaLly interfered
with the plaintiff's existing or potential
economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose
or by improper means, (3) causing injury to the
plaintiff.
657 P.2d at 304.

In this case, plaintiff's Complaint fails to

establish the second element as a matter of law, mandating the
dismissal of plaintiff's Third Cause of Action.
Plaintiff argues that its allegation that St. Benedict's
improperly solicited plaintiff's tenants in breach of its
contractual obligations is sufficient to meet this element.
Appellant's Brief at 24.

First, it should be noted that contrary

to Appellant's claim, plaintiff's Complaint does not allege that
St. Benedict's alleged solicitations were Ln breach of its
contract with plaintiff.

Complaint § 41, R. 14.

Even if it did,

the agreements between the parties clearly do not include the
restrictions plaintiff wants to enforce, and so have not been
breached.

Moreover, even if there had been a breach, plaintiff's

Complaint still fails to state a claim.
1.

No Improper Purpose Exists Due to St. Benedict's
Legitimate Economic Interest.

This Court in Leigh Furniture held that in that case no
claim could be upheld using the improper purpose prong, even
though there was "substantial evidence that the Leigh Corporation
deliberately injured Isom's economic relations."
308.

657 P.2d at

The Court required that Leigh's "predominant purpose" be to

injure Isom and instead found that the
injury was not an end in itself. It was an
intermediate step toward achieving the
-20-

long-range financial goal of profitablyreselling the building free of Isom's interest.
Because that economic interest seems to have
been controlling, we must conclude that the
evidence in this case would not support a jury
finding that the Corporation's predominant
purpose was to injure or ruin Isom's business
merely for the sake of injury alone.
Id. at 308.
In this case, the agreements plaintiff attached to its
Complaint clearly establish the economic interest of St.
Benedict's in having an adequate amount of first-class
professional office space on or near its campus to serve admitting
physicians.

Leigh Furniture dictates that the improper purpose

prong is insufficient to state a claim due to the long-range,
legitimate economic interest St. Benedict's has in making ample,
first-class office space available to its doctors.

As this Court

Stated, the improper purpose alternative
takes the long view of the defendant's conduct,
allowing objectionable short-run purposes to be
eclipsed by legitimate long-range economic
motivation. Otherwise, much competitive commercial
activity . . . could become tortious. In the rough
and tumble of the marketplace, competitors
inevitably damage one another in the struggle for
personal advantage. The law offers no remedy for
those damages—even if intentional—because they
are an inevitable byproduct of competition.
Problems inherent in proving motivation or purpose
make it prudent for commercial conduct to be
regulated for the most part by the improper means
alternative, which typically requires only a
showing of particular conduct.
657 P.2d at 307.

Similarly, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

states that interference with prospective contractual relations is
not improper if Mhis purpose is at least in part to advance his
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interest in competing with the other."
added).

Section 768(d) (emphasis

Plaintiff's Complaint does not and cannot allege that St.

Benedict's sole or even predominate purpose in doing the acts
alleged is to injure plaintiff.
2.

No Improper Means Are Alleged.

The requirement for showing improper means is
well-defined in Leigh Furniture, which stated that "such acts are
illegal or tortious in themselves and hence are clearly 'improper*
means of interference."

657 P.2d at 308.

The only improper means

plaintiff refers to here are that the defendants acted "wilfully,
knowingly in concert with each other."
R. 139.

Memo. In Opp. at p. 15,

That claim, even if amended to allege a breach of

contract between St. Benedict's and plaintiff, falls far short of
being illegal or tortious in itself, and clearly is not "contrary
to law," a "violation of statutes, regulations, or recognized
common-law rules," or "violence, threats or other intimidation,
deceit or misrepresentation, bribery, unfounded litigation,
defamation, or disparaging falsehood."

657 P.2d at 308.

Plaintiff has failed to allege any act by St. Benedict's rising to
the level necessary to establish a claim of improper means, and so
has failed to adequately please a claim of intentional
interference with economic relations.

Therefore, the Court below

was correct in dismissing plaintiff's Third Cause of Action
without prejudice.
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III.

NONE OF PLAINTIFF'S OTHER ARGUMENTS MANDATE REVERSING THE
ORDER OF THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT,
Plaintiff touches on several other items in its brief,

but none of them provide any basis for the reversal of this
decision.

First, plaintiff asserts that Judge Roth considered

material not properly before him in reaching his conclusion.

The

two points plaintiff relies on for this claim are that counsel for
defendants argued that there were no express provisions of the
contractual agreements breached and that the court allegedly held
that "the plaintiff was •sophisticated1".
26.

Appellant's Brief at

As to the first point, it remains St. Benedict's position

that no express provisions of the leases provide the restrictions
and remedies plaintiff seeks in this action.

Moreover, the

transcript clearly shows that Judge Roth's ruling that there was
no specific language to require St. Benedict's to provide the
plaintiff a right of first refusal on any future medical office
building was based on the arguments, the contracts, the Complaint,
and the memoranda.

R. 205-34.

The fact that Judge Roth agreed,

as would anyone else reading the agreements in question, that the
express provision plaintiff seeks to enforce in this case simply
does not exist does not mean the judge was somehow improperly
influenced by defense counsel.
As to plaintiff's second point, the judge did not hold
that plaintiff was "sophisticated."

As a review of the transcript

shows, he indicated that the contracts were sophisticated.
stated:
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He

There is no claim that the parties to this
contract entered into the contract unknowingly or
under duress, or that there was unequal
bargaining power on one side or*the other. The
contracts are detailed. They are sophisticated.
It appears to me if that's what the parties
intended, that's what they could have said.
R. 205-35.

The reference to "sophisticated" clearly must be to

the detailed contracts, and that it is an inference which is
properly drawn from having read through the detailed and lengthy
contracts involved.

St. Benedict's would also note that

plaintiff's complaint about defense counsel's reference to the
fact that the contracts were drawn up with the involvement of
attorneys is reflected in the record by the fact that Exhibit "D"
to the Complaint, R. 38-59, shows that it was mailed to St.
Benedict's Development Company in care of its attorney at

the Van

Cott firm.
Plaintiff also complains that it was somehow prejudiced
by not being permitted to pursue discovery to remedy its fatally
defective Complaint.

St. Benedict's would point out for the Court

that it responded to the discovery requests submitted by the
plaintiff on August 8, 1989, more than three weeks prior to the
date of the oral argument on the motions to dismiss.

R. 119.

Even though St. Benedict's had responded to plaintiff's discovery,
plaintiff used none of that information in response to the motion
to dismiss or at the hearing, nor did it use any information
provided in discovery to amend its Third Cause of Action as it was
given leave to do.
this appeal.

Instead, plaintiff chose to go forward with

Clearly plaintiff has had every opportunity to
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make use of any information it learned from St. Benedict's in
discovery, but it has chosen not to do so.
Moreover, the deficiencies in plaintiff's Complaint are
not deficiencies which require discovery to be remedied.
Plaintiffs first two causes of action simply fail to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.

Plaintiffs Third Cause

of Action does not adequately allege the elements of the claim
asserted.

While plaintiff mav'not involve other parties in

baseless lawsuits so it car, pursue discovery to try to determine
whether any meritorious claims exist, if plaintiff had a good
faith basis for as,, Jerting any improper means or improper purpose
on the part of g^. Benedict's, it could have done so in amending
its Comr ia -L nt#

Plaintiff chose not to do, and there is clearly no

e

Jiiror in the lower court's dismissal of that cause of action as

pleaded.
Finally, it should be noted that plaintiff's claim that
the lower court should have provided it an opportunity to amend
its first two causes of action is specious.

First, there is no

evidence that Judge Roth denied any motion to amend which
plaintiff made.

After the judge ruled, counsel for the plaintiff

requested leave to amend as to the Third Cause of Action.
R. 205-36.

That motion was granted, but plaintiff chose not to

take advantage of it, and instead filed this appeal.

Plaintiff

did not seek leave to amend as to the first two causes of action.
In fact, plaintiff requested that the Court certify its ruling so
plaintiff could appeal immediately.
-25-

R. 205-36.

Plaintiffs

argument concerning amendments is a red herring and none of the
cases it cites are on point here.
It is also clear that there is no requirement that the
Court engage in actions which are a waste of time.

Plaintiff's

first two causes of action did not suffer from inadequate
pleading; they are not proper claims.

The restrictive covenant

they seek cannnot be enforced through any implication, and it
simply is not present in any of thS, leases to be enforced as an
express provision.

As was stated in i^owe v. Sorenson Research

Co., Inc., 779 P.2d 668, 669 (Utah 1989), dismissals under Rule
12(b)(6) will be affirmed "if it is apparent t ^ a t

as

a

matter of

law, the plaintiff could not recover under the fac*^ alleged."
Here, under the facts alleged in the Complaint and the c T ^ t r a c t s
attached to it, plaintiff cannot enforce the restriction it set?,!fs'
and cannot obtain an injunction or recover damages for it as a
matter of law.

No amount of amendment of the claims asserted in

the first two causes of action would yield a cognizable claim for
relief, and accordingly, the lower court was correct in dismissing
them with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
The district court was correct in ruling that no express
restrictive covenant such as plaintiff seeks to enforce exists in
the agreements between the parties and that no such covenant may
be implied.

It was also correct in finding that the plaintiff's

Third Cause of Action did not adequately state a claim of tortious
interference with economic advantage.
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For all of the foregoing

reasons, Defendant St. Benedict's Hospital requests that the Court
affirm the Order of the Second District Court.
DATED this J 6?f day of February, 1990.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

/£*L^
Thomas L. Kay
Steven J. Aeschbacher
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
St. Benedict's Hospital
SJA+9051a
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I hereby certify that on the -"-

(;

day of February, 1990,

four true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
ST, BENEDICT'S HOSPITAL were mailed, postage prepaid, by
first-class mail, to the following:
Richard D. Burbidge and
Stephen D. Mitchell of
BURBIDGE St MITCHELL
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
The Boyer Company
139 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Arthur H. Nielsen
John K. Mangum
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza & Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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